'Death to fascism isn't in the catechism': legacies of socialism in Croatian popular music after the fall of Yugoslavia by Baker, Catherine
163
Nar. umjet. 47/1, 2010, pp. 163ﾖ–183, C. Baker, ﾓ“Death to Facism isnﾒ’t in the Catechismﾔ”ﾅ…
Original scienti  c paper   Received: Aug. 20, 2009   Accepted: Jan. 29, 2010
UDK 78.036 POP:39.01](497.5)"1990/..."
  316.7:572:78](497.5)"1990/..."
CATHERINE BAKER
Modern Languages, University of Southampton, Southampton
ﾓ“DEATH TO FASCISM ISNﾒ’T IN THE
CATECHISMﾔ”: LEGACIES OF SOCIALISM IN 
CROATIAN POPULAR MUSIC AFTER THE 
FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA1
This paper discusses both textual and structural legacies of socialism in Croatian 
popular music since the collapse of socialism and Yugoslavia. Yugoslav socialism 
struggled to reconcile socialist consciousness and capitalist consumerism, forcing 
the producers of popular culture to make sense of the political   eld that surrounded 
them and put ideology into practice. The structural conditions of cultural produc-
tion under socialism, the use of socialist iconography and memory as resources in 
post-socialist popular music and the negation of the socialist experience by patriotic 
musicians re  ect three layers of socialist legacy in contemporary Croatian popular 
culture.
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It might seem thankless to seek legacies of socialism in Croatian popular music, 
given how   rmly Croatiaﾒ’s political culture during its establishment as a sover-
eign state was based on rejecting socialism. Yet Croatian independence did not 
signal a total break with the past even though 1990s public discourse required 
exactly that: people who belonged to domestic commercial popular cultureﾒ’s in-
stitutions, audiences and markets were still remembering life in a larger spatial 
entity and a socialist socio-political system although they were sometimes called 
upon to perform a clean rupture with their past. In popular music, socialism left 
both textual and structural legacies. Those who performed, composed, recorded, 
marketed, broadcast, bought, listened to, danced to and enjoyed popular music 
were negotiating the consequences of war and deep-rooted political change on 
a domestic level ﾖ– including a sudden reinterpretation of the ﾓ“domesticﾔ” itself. 
Sometimes, this involved re-interpreting socialism in the light of more recent 
1 An Arts and Humanities Research Council doctoral award made this research possible.164
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personal experiences; sometimes, it meant negating the socialist experience as a 
totalitarian imposition which, according to the founder of the new state, had no 
place in politically independent Croatia.
Individuals who negotiated these local and national changes were simultane-
ously caught up in late 20th century consumer capitalism, which sold itself as the 
most successful model of social organisation. For David Harvey (1999:114), this 
mode of postmodernism sees time and space compressed, local cultural forms ex-
posed to a global commodity market and people brought to turn to a ﾓ“place-bound 
identityﾔ” as an apparent source of security and ﾓ“individuationﾔ” amid change. Zyg-
munt Bauman (1998:2) reinforces the concept of postmodernism as insecurity, 
arguing that its accelerated   ows of goods, capital, people and ideas bene  t a 
minority while leaving most with the low status of ﾓ“[b]eing local in a globalized 
worldﾔ”. He further considers that the postmodern political economy is based on 
producing and distributing ﾓ“public attentionﾔ” (Bauman 1992:ix). Here, where the 
media and popular culture supposedly saturate contemporary society and structure 
what and how people consume, postmodern theory becomes particularly relevant 
to studying popular culture. Croatia and the other post-socialist states did not 
suddenly enter this system in 1989, 1990 or 1991. As socialist systems they had 
also interacted with it beforehand and even accommodated certain of its elements 
within the socialist consciousness that was supposed to structure production and 
consumption of goods and texts.
One way to clarify how popular music adapted to the collapse of socialism 
would be a Bourdieusian approach to practice, incorporating taken-for-granted 
knowledge  and  unspoken  assumptions. Applying  the  entirety  of  his  work  to 
popular culture, however, may be problematic. His own theory of cultural produc-
tion involves literature and art rather than ﾓ“the most widely consumed cultural 
products ﾖ– those disseminated by the mediaﾔ”; it also leaves out the entertainment 
industryﾒ’s multi-national dimension (Hesmondhalgh 2006:218, 220). There are 
more concerns in redirecting a sociology of mid-20th-century middle-class France 
to a (post-)socialist context: if capital and markets under socialism had different 
meanings, Bourdieuﾒ’s ﾓ“cultural capitalﾔ” and ﾓ“symbolic marketsﾔ” would therefore 
not match domestic understandings of those ideas (Verdery 1991:5). It is more 
valuable, perhaps, to redirect Bourdieuﾒ’s more general observations on practice 
and common sense, where he argues (1977:21) that individuals are situated within 
various layers of ﾓ“habitusﾔ” which make actions seem intelligible or unthinkable. 
Stef Jansen (2005:159) has already been able to apply Bourdieuﾒ’s concept of 
ﾓ“distinctionﾔ” (group-de  ning value judgements based on consumption) to explain 
why people who associate themselves with ﾓ“urbanﾔ” cultural environments dislike 
pop-folk music. Fields of practice thus provide an extra way to think about wider 
aspects of popular culture and identity.165
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Does writing about legacies of socialism in popular culture mean writing about 
popular culture in post-socialism? As more time passes, ﾓ“post-socialismﾔ” itself 
ﾖ– originally the study of ﾓ“whatever would follow once the means of production 
were privatized and the [Communist] Partyﾒ’s political monopoly disestablishedﾔ” 
(Chari and Verdery 2009:10ﾖ–11) gets harder to grasp. Although it helped to deal 
with ﾓ“the shock of the newﾔ” after the collapse, it does not account for more recent 
domestic elitesﾔ” interactions with ﾓ“global forcesﾔ” (Sampson 2002:297ﾖ–98); it may 
also gradually lose meaning as those with direct experience of the period exit 
politics (Humphrey 2002:13). At least post-socialism avoids the normative and 
teleological connotations of ﾓ“transitionﾔ”. Whatever one will call it, one should 
bear in mind the risk of constructing an ﾓ“automatic and systematic interpretive 
linkﾔ” between every micro-level process and post-socialism (Prica 2004:144). 
Everything after Yugoslavia is after socialism; it need not all belong to a ﾓ“post-
socialistﾔ” academic project.
Socialism as Ideology and Experience
The production of popular culture in socialist Yugoslavia operated within the dis-
cursive   eld of the ﾓ“socialist consciousnessﾔ”, although producers, journalists and 
politicians contested the   eldﾒ’s content and boundaries ﾖ– just as would happen in 
post-socialism with the   eld of national cultural identity. Socialist theory itself 
went through various convolutions (consider how many constitutions were needed 
to express shifting ideas about the stateﾒ’s nature and function), with symbolic 
foundation in Titoﾒ’s own pronouncements and detailed input from the theorist 
Edvard Kardelj. Kardeljﾒ’s ideas about self-management and the state withering 
away made the ﾓ“socialist consciousnessﾔ” all the more important because they left 
individuals (working through workersﾒ’ councils and mass organisations) to enact 
socialist policy under the guidance of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
(SKJ) (Joviþ 2008:66ﾖ–67). A host of individuals produced ideologyﾒ’s practical 
effect on popular culture by striving to comprehend the changing and confus-
ing theoretical   eld, translating its abstruse principles into their own experience 
and accommodating their own personal circumstances and goals within Titoismﾒ’s 
social and political expectations.
Yugoslav socialismﾒ’s distinctiveness derived from the SKJ coreﾒ’s confusion 
after the Titoﾖ–Stalin split: the ex-Partisans who believed themselves the most 
faithful revolutionaries could not understand their rejection by the pinnacle of 
world Marxismﾖ–Leninism. Their ﾓ“emotional reactionﾔ” led them to construct a 
supposedly more faithful application of original socialist theory around the ﾓ“anti-
bureaucratic and anti-étatistﾔ” principle of self-management, understanding Stalin-
ism as a deviation (Rusinow 1977:50ﾖ–52). Within a Cold War geopolitical context, 166
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Yugoslavia was to be more authentically socialist than the Soviet bloc yet not part 
of the capitalist west. The west, however, courted it as a counterweight to Soviet 
ideology and the Yugoslav regimeﾒ’s development of industry and infrastructure 
(letting it cast itself as the only socialist system which could guarantee modern, 
satisfying living standards) owed much to western economic aid. This geopolitical 
ambiguity created a further layer of tension in translating ideology into practice.
Everyday  experiences  under  Yugoslav  socialism  were  transformed  by  the 
high economic growth in 1953ﾖ–64 as the SKJ reoriented the economy towards 
consumer goods (Luthar 2006:235). Every aspect of consumerism had to be nego-
tiated within the socialist ideological frame, hence Yugoslav advertisers laboured 
to convince economists and policymakers that commercial promotion was legiti-
mate and essential in a socialist market economy (Patterson 2003:217ﾖ–20). The 
Yugoslav market (unlike socialist shortage economies elsewhere) could usually 
supply desired categories of goods, although purchasers often preferred western 
goodsﾒ’ quality and branding. Yugoslaviaﾒ’s proximity to capitalist Italy and Austria 
and its relatively open borders thus produced ﾓ“shopping tourismﾔ”, where families 
and friends travelled (usually in someoneﾒ’s Zastava ﾖ– the ubiquitous Yugoslav car) 
to purchase clothes, electrical goods, household items and even monthly grocer-
ies (ﾊŠvab 2002:66ﾖ–67). What they brought home enabled the emerging Yugoslav 
middle class to implicitly agree symbolic meanings to consumer goods and claim 
and recon  gure a middle-class identity (Luthar 2006:236). The stateﾒ’s customs 
limits were routinely circumvented, yet what it lost in revenue it arguably gained 
in ﾓ“social peaceﾔ” (ﾊŠvab 2002:71, 75), at least until the early 1980s economic crisis 
that shattered householdsﾒ’ purchasing power and destroyed the taken-for-granted 
certainties of Yugoslav everyday life, starting with the capacity to aspire to and 
ful  l a certain standard of living and ending with the very idea of Yugoslavia as a 
socialist federation.
Shopping tourism ﾖ– which also brought home popular-cultural texts (e.g. cheap 
records) ﾖ– transferred to the micro-level the tension between socialist principles 
and consumerist assumptions involved in producing Yugoslav ideology, goods 
and  meaning.  With  popular  music  a  well-established  consumer  good  under 
capitalism, Yugoslav socialists agonised over whether their own market should 
be allowed to overpower the idea of music contributing to and drawing from a 
socialist consciousness. In the late 1950s, however, ﾓ“cultural and political elitesﾔ” 
fought back their suspicions and decided that appropriating the attractive western 
product would contribute to a pan-Yugoslav ﾓ“brotherhood and unityﾔ” culture and 
protect Yugoslavsﾒ’ ﾓ“cultural loyaltiesﾔ” (Vuletiþ 2008:862). Zabavna muzika thus 
became a characteristic of the Yugoslav cultural sphere, even a speciality: in the 
glory days, Yugoslav singers toured both the Soviet bloc and the western (French 
and German) chanson/schlager circuits. The Soviet pro-agitprop, anti-jazz model 
of  cially faded from view, but a vestige endured in musiciansﾒ’ constant negotia-167
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tions with the shifting political   eld (how far to take references to the Party, the 
army or religion?) and the ﾓ“trashﾔ” [ﾓ“ﾚšundﾔ”] tax, republicsﾒ’ punishment for cultural 
texts that let down their socialist function.2
The Politicised Conditions of Production 
Cultural production was clearly caught between political imperatives during the 
1968ﾖ–71 ﾓ“Croatian Springﾔ” intellectualﾖ–political movement (ﾓ“maspokﾔ”), personi-
  ed musically by the Croatian singer Vice Vukovﾒ’s patriotic turn. While maspok 
participants raised awareness of how much money was made in Croatia but trans-
ferred outside, Vukov told hecklers to go back to Belgrade and commented on 
his feud with the Serbian star Žorāe Marjanoviþ in national terms; he appeared at 
one event in a syncretic Croatian folk costume and recorded songs with implicitly 
Croatian-patriotic readings. As the Yugoslav regime prepared to dismantle the 
maspok, Radio Sarajevo and Skopjeﾒ’s annual pop festival refused to feature Vu-
kov, TV Belgrade withheld three TV Zagreb shows with him in and at the end of 
1971, just as the Croatian party leaders were forcibly retired, TV Zagreb dropped 
him too. He spent some years studying in France, then came home and withdrew 
from showbusiness (Lukoviþ 2008).
Vukov (or his absence) tacitly reminded later musicians, broadcasters and 
executives that their professional   eldﾒ’s boundaries were politically de  ned. A 
ﾓ“mass  rock  cultureﾔ”  (Perasoviþ  2001:144)  of  stadium  concerts  and  specialist 
media emerged in the late 1970s and peaked in the so-called ﾓ“new waveﾔ” of 1980s 
rock. Yugoslav rock has been seen both as a means of extending public space and 
enabling expression outside of  cial institutions, most of all in Slovenia (PogaĀar 
2008:822ﾖ–23), and as a safety valve for rebellion which appealed to urban youth 
but did not challenge the underlying socialist order. It also provided a salutary 
example of one Yugoslav cultural space where young people travelled between 
different republicsﾒ’ major cities to follow their favourite bands, a mobility they 
took for granted at the time (VolĀiĀ 2007a:78ﾖ–79). In Sarajevo, the 1980s ﾓ“New 
Primitivesﾔ”  movement  affectionately  wove  Titoist/Partisan  imagery  into  their 
productions: thus Zabranjeno puﾚšenjeﾒ’s   rst album Das ist Walter alluded to the 
classic Partisan   lm Valter brani Sarajevo [Walter defends Sarajevo] and Plavi 
orkestarﾒ’s second was Smrt faﾚšizmu [Death to fascism], echoing the anti-fascist 
struggleﾒ’s slogan.
2 For a case study of the political impact on Yugoslav newly-composed folk music, see Rasmussen 
(2002). NCFM had to negotiate the ethnopolitical axis of the concept of the ﾓ“narodﾔ” [ﾓ“peopleﾔ”] (as 
Kardelj moved towards an even more decentralised concept of the state, the emphasis moved from 
a single Yugoslav people to the cultural expression of a political balancing act among six ﾓ“narodiﾔ”) 
while also proving its worth within a mass-culture discourse suspicious of commodi  ed popular 
entertainment.168
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For those who produced musical texts, negotiating Yugoslav socialismﾒ’s   uid 
ideological   eld was one more ordinary professional practice. Contributing to the 
public representation of Titoist ideology was often a routine work activity: songs 
abounded to do with Tito, Yugoslavia, industrialisation, youth work actions and 
the Partisan uprising, and the socialist commemorative calendarﾒ’s events encom-
passed popular music as well as folklore displays. Zabavna, rock and folk per-
formers played at events such as the annual celebration of the Yugoslav National 
Army (JNA) and, especially in the 1980s, pop festivals incorporated dedicated 
patriotic evenings.
Performers and composers from every republic, including Croatia, participated 
in the ongoing musical memorialisation of socialist society and Tito. Some songs 
produced in Croatia ﾖ– notably Druﾞže Tito, mi ti se kunemo [Comrade Tito, we swear 
to you], written by Žorāe Novkoviþ and performed by Zdravko ÿoliþ from Sara-
jevo (where Novkoviþ grew up)3 ﾖ– would enter post-socialist nostalgic vocabulary 
alongside Žorāe Balaﾚševiþﾒ’s and Lepa Brenaﾒ’s Yugoslav standards. Other songs 
waned because they failed to resonate with listeners long-term or because they 
did not   t their musiciansﾒ’ post-socialist public personas. Doris Dragoviþﾒ’s Hej, 
Jugosloveni [Hey, Yugoslavs], Oliver Dragojeviþﾒ’s Tito i prva proleterska [Tito 
and the   rst proletarian [brigade]] and many more would eventually re-surface on 
nostalgia compilations outside Croatia and/or online, but became meaningless or 
worse at home.
Songs about the socialist system also entered the everyday entertainment space 
beyond any marked commemorative   eld ﾖ– or rather, socialism did not recognise 
an everyday apolitical entertainment space as a concept. The Croatian pop singer 
Boris Novkoviþ, Žorāeﾒ’s son and a nascent teen idol, was conscripted in 1986 
soon after his debut hit Tamara had made him a pop sensation. He joined the 
army on schedule, but not before recording the ballad Odlazim i ja u JNA [Iﾒ’m 
leaving for the JNA too], in which the narrator and his girlfriend, contemplating 
his departure, were resting in a bedroom papered with James Dean posters. Just 
as military service was an expected life stage for all Yugoslav males, being left 
behind when your boyfriend was conscripted was a situation every (heterosexual) 
Yugoslav teenage girl could expect to experience. The principle of appropriating 
a western popular-cultural form in order to construct Yugoslav political identities 
had   rst been espoused by the party in the 1950s (Vuletiþ 2008:862) and reappears 
in Reana Senjkoviþﾒ’s commentary on the teenage girlsﾒ’ magazine Tina (a title 
franchised from Britain). Tinaﾒ’s editors at the Vjesnik group in Zagreb recon  g-
ured the contents of a western teen magazine within a socialist consciousness ﾖ– for 
instance, turning the problem page into a promotion of ﾓ“the fundamental principle 
of  the  survival  of  the  Yugoslav  socialist  communityﾔ”  (Senjkoviþ  2008:121). 
3 The songﾒ’s title already belonged to an anonymous Partisan-era poem (with different lyrics) 
and was seen on school front doors and textbooks (Bringa 2004:158).169
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Odlazim i ja u JNA, too,   t perfectly into this practice (and indeed targeted much 
the same age group). For understandable reasons, however, the song did not pass 
into the repertoire of nostalgic musical memories which would be exchanged on 
video websites and MP3 blogs some twenty years later. The JNA of the established 
socialist state (as distinct from the Partisansﾒ’ mythic army) was a problematic 
topic for tender everyday commemoration, most of all in Croatia, where the JNAﾒ’s 
primary meaning in the 1990s was as the adversary of a new war.
When Franjo Tuāmanﾒ’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) replaced the Com-
munists as the political power-holders in Croatia, music professionals usually 
presented their accommodation to socialist politics as an irksome, unwelcome 
obligation. It was common to say that under socialism Croatia could not be men-
tioned ﾖ– an exaggeration which nonetheless, after Vukov, made some sense. The 
regimeﾒ’s suspicion of nationalism had still not prevented musicians performing 
and selling songs about their relationship to place, community and home (united 
in the concept of the ﾓ“zaviĀajﾔ” or birthplace), although they had expressed their 
sentiments to the region not the nation; it seemed natural when their language and 
images for the zaviĀaj were transferred to the ﾓ“domovinaﾔ” [ﾓ“homelandﾔ”] after 
1990. Religious allusions in popular music tested the boundaries of the socialist 
ideological   eld, which attempted to limit churchesﾒ’ everyday relevance. Tomislav 
IvĀiþ claimed in 1991 that his 1979 recording of Roko, about a Dalmatian named 
Roko after his native island of Sveti Rok, kept him shut out of Splitski festival 
until 1990, when the Communists no longer had power over it (Pribiþ 1991). In 
Croatian rock (and political) mythology, the   rst sign of political loosening oc-
curred on New Yearﾒ’s Eve 1989, when Prljavo kazaliﾚšte performed Ruﾞža hrvatska 
[Croatian rose] on Trg Bana JelaĀiþa in central Zagreb (Perasoviþ 2001:218). The 
consolidation of Tuāmanﾒ’s government and its response to the war nonetheless 
hardened a new discursive   eld ﾖ– if, indeed, the   eldﾒ’s shape was so very new.
Commentaries on Socialism and Its Present Relevance
The dominant public discourse of 1990s Croatia denied socialism any relevance 
in the present, although every inhabitant ﾖ– from the president, a former JNA gen-
eral and of  cial historian, downwards ﾖ– had been implicated in the ideological 
  eld where all aspects of socialist life belonged. Many writers have described the 
erasure and destruction of socialist legacies (street names; monuments) in public 
space (e.g. Drakuliþ 1996; Ugreﾚšiþ 1998; Rihtman-Auguﾚštin 2000, 2004); indi-
viduals felt compelled to ﾓ“re-interpret [ﾅ…] their own biographiesﾔ” to disentangle 
themselves from the suddenly undesirable connotations of a socialist, multi-ethnic 
past (Jansen 2002:82). The new public meaning of socialism, as espoused by many 
losers of the Croatian Spring, was an ideology which had been fundamentally 170
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committed to eradicating Croatianness as an acceptable identity although it had 
misled some of its Partisan adherents into thinking socialism would truly liberate 
Croatia.
Zygmunt Bauman (1992:17) claims the postmodern state has withdrawn from 
regulating or ideologising culture and left cultural production to the market of 
ﾓ“consumption as entertainmentﾔ”, disappointing intellectuals who had hoped to 
replace the state as arbiters. This market-driven sphere is not suddenly free of 
content-structuring ideological assumptions based on cultural producersﾒ’ habiti 
(Kellner 1995), nor of inequalities in the hegemonic power of representation (Hall 
ed. 1997); however, it lacks the explicit level of endeavouring to align cultural 
production with ideology which typi  ed socialism. By these criteria, 1990s Croa-
tia did not enter postmodernism at once. The state still took signi  cant interest in 
commercialised cultural content, while implicitly and explicitly situating oneﾒ’s 
own production within the new prevailing public ideology invited advancement 
and patronage. Popular culture was still politically structured, albeit around anti-
socialism not socialism.
All post-Yugoslav states, however, witnessed a revival of iconography and 
cultural texts associated with the socialist regime (and/or experiences of multi-
ethnicity and inter-republic travel). These practices are often called ﾓ“Yugonostal-
giaﾔ”, although that may fail to capture the textsﾒ’ and symbolsﾒ’ full range of mean-
ings (Velikonja 2002:194). In Croatia, for instance, the continuum extends from 
subcultural practices and distinctive features of a local music scene to commercial 
entertainment enterprises with corporate sponsorship (e.g. Bijelo dugmeﾒ’s 2005 
reunion). The capital of overt Croatian nostalgia was Titoﾒ’s birthplace, Kumrovec, 
where the anniversary of Dan mladosti [Youth Day] attracted domestic and other 
ex-Yugoslav visitors and enabled locals to bene  t from hospitality and souvenir 
stalls.4 The  celebrations  formally  began  with  joint  singing  of  socialist  choral 
songs, many of which also had pop versions by well-known musicians (Petroviþ 
and Rubiþ 2006:232ﾖ–35). Throughout a collection of anthropological essays on 
Kumrovec, a key musical text is RaĀunajte na nas [Count on us], an early song 
by the Novi Sad singer-songwriter Žorāe Balaﾚševiþ which described his young 
generationﾒ’s loyalty to Titoﾒ’s principles.5 The song was produced in Croatia but 
4 One researcherﾒ’s interviews suggest Istria was the most heavily represented Croatian region 
there, Slavonia and Dalmatinska zagora the least (Birt 2006:354ﾖ–55).
5 The narrator initially says he does ﾓ“not mention the past and far[-off] battles, because I was 
only born after themﾔ” [ﾓ“ne spominjem proﾚšlost i bitke daleke, jer roāen sam tek posle njihﾔ”], yet 
he ﾓ“know[s] that another hundred offensives await usﾔ” [ﾓ“ja znam da nas Āeka joﾚš sto ofanzivaﾔ”]. 
Although ﾓ“some suspect the wrong   ow carries us, because we listen to records and play rockﾔ” 
[ﾓ“sumnjaju neki da nosi nas pogreﾚšan tok, jer sluﾚšamo ploĀe i sviramo rokﾔ”], Balaﾚševiþﾒ’s narrator 
and his fellow band-members (Bilja Krstiþ, Verica Todoroviþ and Bora Žorāeviþ) promise that ﾓ“the 
destiny of future days is in us, which may frighten some people / Partisansﾒ’ blood runs through our 
veinsﾔ” [ﾓ“u nama je sudbina buduþi dana, i neke se moﾞžda plaﾚše za nju / kroz vene nam protiĀe krv 
partizanaﾔ”].171
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still formed part of Croatiaﾒ’s textual legacy of socialism. Istrian punk, meanwhile, 
has used socialist symbols as a signi  er of contemporary anti-fascism (as per 
German ﾓ“antifaﾔ” punk), and certain groups, e.g. Titoﾒ’s Bojs from Labin, refer 
more directly to domestic socialism in critiquing capitalism and Americanisation 
(KovaĀiþ 2006:322ﾖ–23).6
Yugonostalgia had ambivalent micro-political meanings. While individualsﾒ’ 
nostalgia in shaping a shared musical space from retrospectively-excluded musi-
cal texts contributed to wider discursive strategies resisting the predominance of 
ethnicity (Jansen 2005), Zala VolĀiĀ (2007b:34) has argued that commercialised 
nostalgic forms shut off re  ection on the political responsibility for destroying the 
past. This is often, but not always, the case: within the Croatian cultural economy, 
the rapper Edo Maajka and the art-rock group Let 3 have used various aspects of 
Yugoslav socialist iconography to frame incisive commentary on the post-Yugo-
slav, post-socialist experience. Let 3ﾒ’s 2005 album Bombardiranje Srbije i ÿaĀka 
[The bombing of Serbia and ÿaĀak] pictured the band-members on the cover in 
the Yugoslav republicsﾒ’ folk costumes and combined its songs7 into a critically 
acclaimed satire of exaggerated Balkan masculinity and showbusinessﾖ–folk. Edo 
Maajka (Edin Osmiþ) as a MC and lyricist concentrates on the realities of post-
war life in BiH and Croatia through themes such as war pro  teering, cross-border 
  rearms/tobacco/drugs  smuggling,  human  traf  cking,  the  mid-1990s  Zagreb 
rock scene, the unfamiliar presence of US soldiers in BiH and the meanings of 
Bosnian/ex-Yugoslav language and culture in emigration. The visuals of his 2006 
and 2008 albums drew on familiar socialist themes: Stigﾒ’o þumur [The coalﾒ’s ar-
rived] depicted young miners in hip-hop poses, and the cover of Balkansko a naﾚše 
[Balkan and/but ours] pictured a boy Pioneer with US stars and stripes overlaid on 
his blue hat and red scarf. The image wrote socialism into the narration of Osmiþﾒ’s 
own experience, not the only determinant but still indelible.
Beyond iconography, a small but equally interesting amount of popular music 
(represented here by Zabranjeno puﾚšenje and Alka Vuica) also used its lyrics to 
discuss everyday manifestations of the experiences of socialism, representing 
6 The mining town of Labin was a site of strong engagement with the socialist legacy. Titoﾒ’s 
Bojs aside, Labinﾒ’s Vertigo club began organising Dan mladosti nights in 1998, playing Yugoslav 
new-wave music and contemporary alternative rock from Croatia and Serbia (Mrkiþ Modriþ 2002). 
Labin was also one of the   rst Croatian towns to host Serbian rock musicians, often by invitation of 
the Labin Art Express collective.
7 Among them: Ero s onoga svijeta (from Jakov Gotovacﾒ’s Dinaric folk-opera); the Serbian 
patriotic song Rado ide Srbin u vojnike [The Serb happily goes for a soldier]; Žorāe Marjanoviþﾒ’s 
Beograde [[Oh,] Belgrade]; ﾊŠaban ﾊŠauliþﾒ’s Doāi da ostarimo zajedno [Come so that we can grow 
old together] combined with Deep Purpleﾒ’s Child In Time; Miﾚšo KovaĀﾒ’s Odvest þu te na vjenĀanje 
[Iﾒ’ll take you to the wedding], in Croatian and Slovenian versions; the Macedonian folk-song Zurle 
trestat [The zurle [pipe] is sounding]; Pjevaj mi, pjevaj, sokole [Sing to me, falcon], a folk song from 
Montenegro/Herzegovina/Lika; Ferid Avdiþﾒ’s Izaāi mala [Come out, darling] transposed into back-
slang to sound linguistically Other; some original compositions.172
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personal and public legacies in the present. One group of ZP members, includ-
ing Elvis J Kurtoviþ and Sejo Sexon, reformed in Zagreb after the destruction of 
Sarajevo. Their 1999 song Jugo 45 used the iconic Zastava car to depict a young 
personﾒ’s family life and the decline of Yugoslav Sarajevo. First came a typically 
humorous anecdote about the narratorﾒ’s ﾓ“old manﾔ” squeezing the car into a tight 
parking spot; they used it for holidays, seaside trips and buying jeans in Trieste; 
their neighbours Franjo and Momo and his maternal uncle Mirso (archetypal 
Croat/Serb/Bosniak names) borrowed it for selling apples, taking a pregnant wife 
to hospital and visiting prostitutes, laughter   lled the house and the Jugo 45 was 
in the garage [ﾓ“u kuþi puno smijeha, u baﾚšþi Jugo 45ﾔ”]. One evening the narra-
tor heard dark murmurs from the three neighbours in the garage; ﾓ“our Jugo 45 
looked very small that nightﾔ” [ﾓ“izgledﾒ’o je baﾚš mali to veĀe naﾚš Jugo 45ﾔ”], and one 
morning the family ﾓ“  ed with two nylon bags,   rst along Lenin street, then down 
Ljubljana streetﾔ” [ﾓ“pobjegli smo jednog jutra s dvije kese najlonske / prvo malo 
Lenjinovom, pa preko Ljubljanskeﾔ”] ﾖ– a miniature image of socialist Yugoslaviaﾒ’s 
history from Leninist start to democratising, disillusioned   nish. They ended up, 
like so many Bosnians, in a different city and apartment; the father, successfully 
negotiating BiHﾒ’s new ethno-political realities, became a minister in a post-Dayton 
canton.
The Croatian musician and journalist Alka Vuica, meanwhile, was one of few 
performers and even fewer women who engaged with social and political devel-
opments through zabavna music (rather than rock) ﾖ– an extra dimension which 
arguably made her the most subversive recording artist in 1990s Croatia.8 Vuica 
had had strong connections with the 1980s Sarajevo rock scene before taking up 
music herself. Her 2004 song Pioniri [Pioneers], sampling the Pioneersﾒ’ anthem 
and Titoﾒ’s speeches,9 described the disillusionment of a woman who had believed 
during her idealistic Pioneer childhood ﾓ“that there would never be war, and the 
two coolest guys were Tito and my dadﾔ” [ﾓ“vjerovala sam da nikad neþe biti rata, 
i da su najveþi frajeri Tito i moj tataﾔ”]. Yet Tito, the celebrated womaniser, had 
ﾓ“buggered us allﾔ” [ﾓ“svima nama uvalio ga zguzaﾔ”], boys had ﾓ“taken off [Pioneer] 
scarves and tied cravatsﾔ” [ﾓ“skinuli ste maramice, svezali kravateﾔ”] ﾖ– an observa-
tion shifting complicity in nationalist politics towards men and away from women 
ﾖ– and the song played out with a folk song from Zagorje, Titoﾒ’s and Tuāmanﾒ’s 
native region.
8 Her 1990s career ﾖ– covering Goran Bregoviþ songs (when he was still a suspicious   gure for 
leaving Sarajevo and collaborating with Emir Kusturica), agreeing to perform in Belgrade in De-
cember 1999 and rejecting early-1990s prescriptive linguistics which would have re-titled her song 
Laﾞži me ﾓ“Laﾞži miﾔ” ﾖ– subtly illustrated how a life could have strong patriotic credentials (in one inter-
view about Laﾞži me she related her familyﾒ’s resistance to Italianisation during the Fascist occupation 
of Istria (Stojsavljeviþ 1995)) yet not   t the presidential narrativeﾒ’s narrow cultural boundaries.
9 Music and singing coloured the Pioneer experience for many children under socialism, includ-
ing both authors of an article on music at Kumrovec (Petroviþ and Rubiþ 2006:223ﾖ–24).173
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On the same album, another song, Bosna [Bosnia], imagined Yugoslav life 
more sweetly in a duet with the Bosnian sevdah singer Halid Beﾚšliþ, set to a 
melody from the Turkish pop singer Tarkan. Beﾚšliþ sang that he was dreaming 
of old friends [ﾓ“a ja sanjam stare drugoveﾔ”], using the Bosnian ﾓ“drugﾔ” [ﾓ“friendﾔ”]
rather than the post-Yugoslav Croatian ﾓ“prijateljﾔ”; Vuica replied ﾓ“every day I 
think of you, of Sarajevo and of us, [of] the eightiesﾔ” [ﾓ“svaki dan mislim na tebe, 
na Sarajevo i na nas, osamdeseteﾔ”]. Vuica was ﾓ“still in the garage and like[d] the 
same rock and rollﾔ” [ﾓ“joﾚš sam u garaﾞži, volim isti rock and rollﾔ”]; Beﾚšliþ invited 
her to the kafana, the typical folk venue, where he was still ﾓ“playing the same folk 
[songs]ﾔ” [ﾓ“u kafanu zaāi, sviram iste narodneﾔ”].10 The pair were reunited in the 
Āarﾚšija (the Sarajevo marketplace) and sang together that ﾓ“everything changes but 
we donﾒ’t [ﾅ…] Bosnia foreverﾔ” [ﾓ“sve se mijenja a mi ne [ﾅ…] Bosna zauvijekﾔ”].
The Negation of Socialist Experience
With political change in early 1990s Croatia came a shift of symbolic power which 
re-bounded the discursive   eld understood to structure the limits of the ﾓ“think-
ableﾔ” (Bourdieuﾒ’s ﾓ“doxaﾔ”). As in most other post-socialist countries, governing 
anti-Communists narrated a fundamental opposition between ﾓ“Communismﾔ” and 
ﾓ“democracyﾔ” (such that democracyﾒ’s primary meaning sometimes seemed to be 
ﾓ“anti-Communismﾔ”, not other components such as political pluralism or popular 
sovereignty) and posited Communism as an ongoing political threat. The latter 
narrative made particular sense during the Homeland War, when the JNA (once 
the Partisan narrativeﾒ’s major bene  ciary) had attacked Croatia alongside rebel 
Krajina Serbs. After the JNA offensive and Slobodan Miloﾚševiþﾒ’s co-option of 
socialism, any further Croatian appeals to socialist war memory would be tinged 
with the knowledge that that memoryﾒ’s protagonists and heroes had become the 
antagonists of the independent stateﾒ’s own founding narrative. Anti-Communists 
found further evidence of a socialist plot against Croatia in the knowledge that the 
State Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH) had 
been subsumed and its leaders persecuted by the Yugoslav state.
Tuāmanﾒ’s of  cial imperative to promote ﾓ“national uni  cationﾔ” between for-
mer Partisans and Ustaﾚše because both sides had believed they were   ghting for 
Croatia (Uzelac 2006:202) proved more bene  cial for the memory of Ustaﾚšism 
than socialism. When later politicians called Croatia a state founded on anti-
fascism (distancing the contemporary state from the NDHﾒ’s internationally more 
troubling legacy), they added the somewhat ingenuous caveat that anti-fascism 
10 Another example of expansive linguistic space in Vuicaﾒ’s lyrics (Croatian has ﾓ“kavanaﾔ”). The 
rockﾖ–folk convergence implied in the reunion had characterised the pre-war ﾓ“Sarajevo schoolﾔ” of 
popular music.174
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and Communism had to be distinguished. While the aspiration to defeat fascism 
had certainly connected socialist and non-socialist allies and provided a rationale 
for the idealism of European uni  cation, insisting on separating anti-fascism and 
socialism ignored 45 years of their inseparability in Yugoslav public discourse. 
Events  ostensibly  commemorating  the  ﾓ“anti-fascist  struggleﾔ”  demanded  the 
publicﾒ’s continued sacri  ce and loyalty for the Yugoslav state, while the slogan 
ﾓ“Smrt faﾚšizmu, sloboda naroduﾔ” [ﾓ“Death to fascism, freedom for the peopleﾔ”]
was used in the Pioneersﾒ’ song and banalised into everyday childhood experience. 
In Yugoslav terms, anti-fascism could be distinguished from socialism far more 
easily in 1945 than in 1990.
The opposition protests which dogged Ivica RaĀanﾒ’s 2000ﾖ–03 governments 
responded to the   rst occasion in sovereign Croatia that a former Communist who 
had not distanced himself from state socialism as a Croatian Spring victim and/or 
HDZ member held political power. Politicians from HDZ and further right-wing 
parties, former generals/admirals (including some of those forcibly retired by 
President Stipe Mesiþ in 2000), veteransﾒ’ lobbyists and musicians united in their 
allegations against RaĀan and Mesiþ, among which the most successful allega-
tions were the interlinked charges of Communism (playing on RaĀanﾒ’s previous 
political allegiance and Mesiþﾒ’s liberalism) and treachery to the nation. The classic 
central European post-1989 model of claims and counter-claims of Communist 
activity arguably did not become established in Croatia until RaĀanﾒ’s ministry, but 
became endemic thereafter.
The anti-Mesic/RaĀan protests facilitated a strand of oppositionalﾖ–patriotic 
popular music, epitomised by Marko Perkoviþ Thompson, which had crystallised 
alongside veteransﾒ’ disaffection in late Tuāmanism and emerged as Thompsonﾒ’s 
primary theme by 2002. Thompsonﾒ’s willingness to consider the NDH as a legiti-
mate moment in the Croatian statehood tradition (rather than a criminal ally of 
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) and his re-use of certain NDH language made 
him a divisive public   gure; controversies over NDH memory were at the forefront 
of his meanings as a star.11 However, the worldview Thompson constructed dealt 
just as much with socialism (or its negation). In challenging and rejecting social-
ist memory, Thompson and similar musicians also equated modern-day political 
opponents with communists who (patriotic discourse held) were automatically 
antagonistic to national interests. These recon  gured communists could either be 
demonised or mocked; either way, as Katherine Verdery (1996:90) argues, the al-
legations formed part of a ﾓ“larger process of reconstituting political legitimaciesﾔ” 
by contesting the bases of ﾓ“moral authorityﾔ”.
Thompson, for one, took the socialist enemy seriously. His 2002 song E, moj 
narode [Oh, my people] included communists (besides ﾓ“antichrists and masonsﾔ”) 
11 On the compatibility between Thompsonﾒ’s music and other songs directly praising the NDH, 
see Senjkoviþ and Dukiþ 2005.175
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among the Croatian narodﾒ’s historical enemies. When his next new album came 
around, many journalists and liberal intellectuals had built a lasting image of him 
as a far-right extremist, based on potential allusions to Ustaﾚša language in his 
lyrics, audience behaviour and his association with a song mocking the NDH 
concentration camps (unrecorded by him but attributed to him on bootleg live 
MP3s). In one new song that defended his right to express himself, Neka niﾒ’ko 
ne dira u moj mali dio svemira [Let nobody touch my little bit of the universe], 
he framed the controversy within the continuity of political antagonisms. He 
thus claimed that ﾓ“for them Iﾒ’m a fascistﾔ” although he only wanted a/the ﾓ“free 
countryﾔ” [ﾓ“za njih sam faﾚšista, a nikad nisam htio tuāe niﾚšta, samo nju, zemlju 
slobodnuﾔ”]. His critics were ﾓ“servile pens attacking as if they had defended their 
villagesﾔ” [ﾓ“napadaju ta sluganska pera kﾒ’o da oni branili su selaﾔ”] ﾖ– whereas he, 
as an army volunteer, had ﾖ– and he accused them of calling patriotism fascism just 
ﾓ“to defend their communismﾔ” [ﾓ“domoljublje prozvali faﾚšizam, tako brane njihov 
komunizamﾔ”]. Other musicians too framed contemporary political disputes as a 
clash between communism and right-thinking patriots: e.g., in 2007, the tambu-
rica group Slavonski dukati/Mladi ﾚšest released Nije na prodaju [Itﾒ’s not for sale] 
during a political controversy over Serbian investment in Slavonia. The lyricsﾒ’ 
narrator said that at Easter she always saw people she remembered as atheists 
(i.e. ex-Communists) pretending to care about Christ [ﾓ“[ﾅ…] neki prave da im je 
stalo do tebe, Kriste / a ja ih pamtim kao ateisteﾔ”]. The rest of the song warned 
ﾓ“former comradesﾔ” [ﾓ“bivﾚši drugoviﾔ”] not to sell off the plains like they had sold 
off Croatiaﾒ’s islands and waterways.12
The nebulous communist Other could, instead, be ridiculed. Niko Bete, best 
known for songs honouring Ante Gotovina and Mirko Norac,13 did that on a 2004 
album track, Dva drugara [Two comrades], which mocked the boy Partisans from 
the popular Yugoslav comic-strip Nikad robom (voice samples used their catch-
phrase ﾓ“Pazi metak!ﾔ”).14 The two characters turn left in the forest and are captured 
by ﾓ“bearded faces everyone knowsﾔ” [ﾓ“lica bradata svima dobro poznataﾔ”] ﾖ– the 
caricature of ÿetniks and Serbs ﾖ– where they meet an unspeci  ed unhappy end; 
the songﾒ’s ĀoĀek arrangement emphasised the image of Serbdom overpowering 
Communism.  Shortyﾒ’s  Narodna  [Folk  [music],  2007)  parodied Yugoslav  and 
post-Yugoslav pop-folk music by alluding to well-known pop-folk lyrical tropes, 
12 More precisely, not to touch ﾓ“myﾔ” plains [ﾓ“u ravnicu mi ne dirajteﾔ”] ﾖ– alluding to the title of 
a famous Homeland War tamburica song ﾖ– because ﾓ“weﾔ” had died and fought for them [ﾓ“za to smo 
ginuli, za nju ratovaliﾔ”]. See Baker 2009:44.
13 Both generals   ed from war crimes investigations in 2001. Norac brie  y disappeared that 
February; domestic courts convicted him of war crimes in March 2003 and (on the Hague Tribunalﾒ’s 
extra charges) May 2008. Gotovina remained at large between July 2001 (when the Tribunal indicted 
him) and his arrest in Tenerife in December 2005. The Hague began his trial in 2008.
14 Contemporary socialist cultural criticism disliked the strip (Senjkoviþ 2008:60ﾖ–61), yet it still 
entered the complex of nostalgic memories.176
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jokes about famous singers and stereotypes of typical folk listeners. Such stereo-
types (male folk listeners who drive a Mercedes, wear thick necklaces, smoke 
fake western cigarettes and show off mobile phones) were also widespread in 
ﾓ“anti-nationalistﾔ” anti-folk discourse (Jansen 2005), although ﾓ“anti-nationalistsﾔ” 
associated tastes for folk with Croatian as well as Serbian ultra-nationalism. The 
politics of Narodnaﾒ’s othered protagonist were speci  cally Yugoslavﾖ–Serbian, 
as revealed in the manﾒ’s JNA tattoo, his instruction ﾓ“hit the accordion for the 
friends/comrades and companions/letﾒ’s make a kolo up to Titovo Uﾞžiceﾔ” [ﾓ“udri u 
dugmetaru zbog drugova i druﾞžica/napravimo kolo sve do Titovoga Uﾞžicaﾔ”], his 
comment that ﾓ“all Yugoslaviaﾒ’s dancing againﾔ” [ﾓ“igra opet cijela Jugoslavijaﾔ”] and 
his readiness to marry Ceca.15
Certain musiciansﾒ’ lyrics and interviews also suggested that a family and home-
town background of negative experiences under socialism would produce personal 
resolve to challenge communists today. The narratorﾒ’s maternal grandfather and 
uncle in Beteﾒ’s 2004 song Zapjevaj [Sing] were victims of Communism: they had 
ﾓ“fallen for the Home in a far-off summerﾔ” [ﾓ“poginuli su za Dom ljeta dalekogﾔ”] 
and tearfully sung the Ustaﾚša anthem Evo zore, evo dana [Here comes dawn, here 
comes day] at Bleiburg and Goli otok, two sites where Communists persecuted 
NDH soldiers and Domobrani (Home Guardsmen).16 Beteﾒ’s earlier song Za ﾚšaku 
dolara [For a   stful of dollars, 2000] depicted an ordinary Dalmatian happy with 
his modest lot, including the observation that ﾓ“some say ﾑ‘death to fascismﾒ’, thatﾒ’s 
not written in the catechism, my parents taught meﾔ” [ﾓ“neki kaﾞžu ﾑ‘smrt faﾚšizmuﾒ’, to 
ne piﾚše u katekizmu, uĀili me moji stariﾔ”]. Anti-communist politics here were just 
one aspect of a commonsensical family upbringing grounded in religion.
Thompson,  too,  invoked  the  antagonism  between Yugoslav  socialism  and 
Croatian nationalism ﾖ– which, Bete seemed to imply, had produced families that 
still respected the NDH. Thompsonﾒ’s 1998 song Geni kameni [Stone genes] men-
tioned the emigrations of 1945, and his 2000 video for Moj Ivane [O, my Ivan] ﾖ– 
his arrangement of a folk song from Kupres in Herzegovina) showed the return of 
a successful middle-aged émigré greeted by the entire village, including a blonde 
15 Titovo Uﾞžice: the socialist name of Uﾞžice (Serbia); ﾓ“uﾞžiĀko koloﾔ” [Uﾞžice circle-dance] became 
an important signi  er of Serbian folk culture (the antithesis to Croatian national identity). Igra 
rokenrol cijela Jugoslavija [The whole of Yugoslavia is dancing rockﾒ’nﾒ’roll]: the Belgrade band 
ElektriĀni orgazamﾒ’s famous new-wave song. Ceca: a Serbian pop-folk singer, widow of the Serbian 
paramilitary ﾎŽeljko Raﾞžnatoviþ-Arkan.
16 Between Tuāmanﾒ’s election and the war, the singers Žuka ÿaiþ and Ivo Fabijan had both dealt 
with the forced marches and massacre at Bleiburg (known to Croatian nationalists as ﾓ“the Way of 
the Crossﾔ” [ﾓ“Kriﾞžni putﾔ”]). ÿaiþﾒ’s song Kriﾞžni put depicted the younger brother of a Bleiburg vic-
tim, whose mother had been too afraid to tell him; Fabijanﾒ’s Proljeþe u Bleiburgu [Springtime in 
Bleiburg] imagined a murdered Domobranﾒ’s son returning, envisioning the Croatsﾒ’ bones rising up 
and hearing his father warning against war. The narrator of Miroslav ﾊŠkoroﾒ’s 1993 song Mata was 
the son of a Kriﾞžni put survivor who had been imprisoned for several months when ﾓ“theyﾔ” attacked 
Mataﾒ’s village in 1991.177
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girl in folk costume; one sequence, captioned ﾓ“Kupres 1979.ﾔ”, made it clear the 
Yugoslav security services had been searching for him when he left. Thompson 
also cast himself as a chief adversary of contemporary communism off-stage. He 
complained in 2007 about the double standard of public war memory in which 
NDH symbols were treated more harshly than those of Communism:
At the same time as they falsely depict me as a fascist, they celebrate Titoﾒ’s birth-
days. Instead of of  cially proclaiming him the biggest war criminal on these ter-
ritories, young people in Kumrovec wear SFRJ slogans on T-shirts. The fact that 
Tito committed genocide against the Croatian people [hrvatskim narodom] is not 
respected at all. In the Croatian people, nobody does not have someone in the 
family who was killed, persecuted or imprisoned by the Communist regime. That 
way rebelliousness and revolt are created, so people behave how they behave. And 
then they blame me for it, not Tito and his criminal regime (Stjepandiþ and Kaliniþ 
2007).
Thompsonﾒ’s narrative was countered in return in 2008, when the Istrian regional-
ist politician Damir Kajin campaigned against Thompson performing in Umag or 
Pula. Thompson told an audience in Kriﾞževci that ﾓ“weﾒ’ll come [ﾅ…] to the parts 
where  there  is  still  communism,  weﾒ’ll  kill  communismﾔ”(StarĀeviþ  2008)  and 
Kajin responded with a positive and Croatian-patriotic narrative of communism 
in Istrian history (Baker, forthcoming). It may seem obvious for a country that 
gained independence, indeed fought for independence, from a socialist federation 
to develop a popular culture rich in anti-socialist discourse. However, to consider 
it an inevitable consequence of transition and war would obscure the processes of 
discursive distancing and symbolic and physical violence against the historical 
memory of socialism that people carried out during the post-socialist inversion of 
political power relations.
Croatian society is not alone in having to negotiate the socialist pastﾒ’s ambigui-
ties. In Hungary, Budapestﾒ’s House of Terror memorialises Communist persecu-
tion yet arguably downplays Hungariansﾒ’ own complicity and the violence of 
the previous pro-fascist Hungarian state (Rátz 2006:253); the   ercest Estonian 
arguments concern statuesﾒ’ location and movement (Ehala 2009); Latviaﾒ’s focal 
point is the annual Latvian Waffen-SS Legion march. In contemporary Croatia, 
however, these con  icts of memory appear to be played out mainly in popular 
culture, perhaps because other foci have been neutralised or irrelevant. Croatia 
as yet has no national contemporary history museum, and when RaĀan became 
prime minister, equivalents to Estoniaﾒ’s Bronze Soldier were no longer standing. 
Because anti-communism had been woven into the early-1990s presidential nar-
rative of war and independence, the principle was even harder to disentangle from 
the idea of patriotism than in other states which had not changed borders or which 
had seceded peacefully from something larger.17
17 Istria ﾖ– the Croatian region with the most complicated early 20th-century history ﾖ– paradoxi-
cally appears more straightforward than the rest of Croatia. In Istria, the idea of patriotic resistance 178
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Conclusion: Towards a Theory of Popular Music
under Post-socialism?
The fate of socialist war memory suggests that the construction of socialism as 
a constitutive other of the early Croatian state still de  nes the acceptable dis-
cursive   eld for Croatian musical production today. Yet that very phenomenon 
derives from a continued vestigial norm for the boundaries of the   eld to depend 
on the collectivist governing politics of the day ﾖ– where the business of popular 
culture is not just selling entertainment for pro  t but interpellating the consumer 
into a collective state-sanctioned group, be it the Yugoslav socialist community 
or the Croatian narod. It may be more productive to interrogate this framework 
than situate Croatian (or ex-Yugoslav? or post-socialist?) popular culture within 
western academic debates over whether the Frankfurt Schoolﾒ’s pessimism or John 
Fiskeﾒ’s populist optimism offers a more appropriate analysis of the contemporary 
entertainment media.
Marxismﾒ’s in  uence on cultural theory in the west, meanwhile, makes even a 
distinction between ﾓ“westernﾔ” and ﾓ“socialistﾔ” scholarly concepts problematic. It 
cannot be compared to Marxismﾒ’s scale as a constitutive principle for practice as 
well as theory in socialist states, yet the Frankfurt Schoolﾒ’s Marxist basis, not to 
mention Stuart Hallﾒ’s adaptation of Gramsci into cultural studies, suggests one 
should not entirely separate western and socialist domains of thought. Recognis-
ing this interconnectedness would, moreover, respond to Katherine Verderyﾒ’s call 
(2002:20) for a holistic approach to studying the Cold Warﾒ’s impact outside ﾓ“the 
ghetto of Soviet area studiesﾔ”.18 Positions in the western popular culture debate 
also   ow into domestic cultural analysis in post-socialist societies, whether or not 
they should.19
The  intersection  between  socialist  experiences  and  post-socialist  domestic 
politics re  ects the legacies of socialism differently across ex-Yugoslavia. Most 
such research so far concerns Slovenia, which sees both a ﾓ“Balkan cultureﾔ” par-
ticipated in by non-Slovenes and an ironic response epitomised by the rock group 
did not have to be blurred with collaboration, because the Fascists had occupied Croatian territory 
and persecuted Croatians; in Istria, the Partisansﾒ’ role as liberators and Titoﾒ’s resolve over Trieste 
can reconcile sympathy for socialism within the discursive   eld of patriotism, at the price of silence 
over Italian victims of Yugoslav persecution (see Ballinger 2002).
18 As a future direction in studying post-socialism, Verdery also observes that following ﾓ“post-
colonial studiesﾔ” emphasis on the role of knowledge and representation in colonial rule might pro-
vide a ﾓ“new mandate for researchﾔ”. Has south-east European studies, where the post-colonial has 
become a frequent paradigm since the early 1990s (Bakiþ-Hayden 1995; Todorova 1994), already 
anticipated this?
19 Can authors who grew up neither under socialism or under post-socialism answer this question 
as well as raising it ﾖ– or do the meanings of popular culture, consumption or celebrity interfere with 
their comprehending the conceptsﾒ’ full nuances in a post-socialist society?179
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ZakloniﾚšĀe prepeva (Velikonja 2002). Post-Yugoslav representations of socialism 
in different successor states nonetheless depend on a common base of cultural 
and musical texts. In self-consciously nostalgic cultural production and recep-
tion/reuse, the symbolic language of socialism is a convenient shorthand for a 
period of readily attainable consumerist aspirations, ample employment and travel 
opportunities, before visa restrictions, economic sanctions, before the war, the 
destruction of families and homes and before the free market was fully exposed 
to 1990sﾖ–2000s transnational capitalism ﾖ– sentiments which cannot always easily 
be expressed in the few minutes of a for-pro  t single. A certain indirect ﾓ“social-
ist chicﾔ” also   ows back in from a west which only experienced the original as 
fascination. The ragged military jackets, red-  ag-bearing female attendants and 
Alexander Rodchenko-inspired constructivist typography of the video for BiHﾒ’s 
2009 entry at the Eurovision Song Contest in Moscow (Bistra voda [Clear water] 
by Regina) surely owed as much or more to the image of the British bands Franz 
Ferdinand and Coldplay as to the revolutionary artists of Leninist Russia.
The eye-catching, knowing constructs of post-socialist socialist style in texts/
events such as Bijelo dugmeﾒ’s famous three-capital reunion in 2005 should not 
obscure a deeper layer, socialismﾒ’s structural legacies. One such may even be the 
very shape and extent of the contemporary post-Yugoslav music market: e.g. the 
Macedonian music industry exports to the other ex-Yugoslav states (after almost 
  ve decades of Titoﾒ’s promoting a Macedonian ethno-national identity within a 
Yugoslav framework) even though its musicians must use a different language to 
do so.20 At this point, it becomes dif  cult to distinguish socialism as an ideology 
from the experience of living, working and creating in a state of six republics and 
two provinces. The decentralised multiethnic entity of ﾓ“brotherhood and unityﾔ” 
between Yugoslav narodi was so intimately woven into Yugoslav socialism that it 
may not even make sense to pick out what factors are the result of socialist ideol-
ogy and what factors the result of Yugoslaviaﾒ’s larger geographic and economic 
borders.
Dividing comparisons by country also risks missing transnational phenomena 
which used not even to be   agged as such, e.g. contemporary forms of cultural 
  ows between Yugoslav urban centres which are now in different states (such as 
one counterpoint of this paper, the Zagrebﾖ–Sarajevo route). Croatia has shared 
many of the political and economic experiences that make the ﾓ“post-socialismﾔ” 
comparative  relevant:  the  exclusion  of  socialism/Communists  from  political 
dominance, the construction of an ethno-nationalist state identity discourse centred 
on national particularity and traditionally-bounded gender roles, the expanding 
inequalities of the free market, the clientelistic privatisation of state resources 
after the collapse of an ideology holding that they were the property of the people 
20 The   ow became two-way in 2009 when the Croatian singer Antonija ﾊŠola began recording 
in Macedonian.180
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(even if in practice they were not used to the peopleﾒ’s genuine bene  t) and the 
social and political orderﾒ’s gradual adaptation to European Union conditionality. 
Simultaneously, however, post-Yugoslavia plus the Caucasus states and Russia 
belong to a smaller group of societies where prolonged armed con  ict has further 
complicated the idea of common post-socialist experience. In the 21st century, 
statesﾒ’ varying experience of EU membership, non-membership, candidacy and 
conditionality introduce yet more cracks into post-socialist similarity. While dif-
ferent (post-)socialist countries always had their speci  cities (Verdery 1996:11), 
the varying speeds and consequences of EU accession may   nally mark the end 
of the post-socialist comparative.
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ﾓ“SMRT FAﾊŠIZMU, TO NE PIﾊŠE U KATEKIZMUﾔ”: NASLIJEŽE
SOCIJALIZMA U HRVATSKOJ POPULARNOJ GLAZBI
NAKON RASPADA JUGOSLAVIJE
SAﾎŽETAK
U radu se raspravlja o tekstualnom i strukturnom naslijeāu socijalizma u hrvatskoj popularnoj glazbi 
od raspada socijalizma i Jugoslavije. Popularna je kultura u okviru jugoslavenskog socijalizma bila 
nelagodan kompromis izmeāu socijalistiĀke svijesti i kapitalistiĀkog konzumerizma. Popularna je 
glazba doﾞživjela ista proturjeĀja kao i drugi aspekti ﾞživota u Jugoslaviji, poput shopping-turizma, 
a pregovaranje s ideoloﾚškim poljem socijalistiĀke prakse bilo je rutinski dio profesionalnog ﾞživota 
glazbenika. Najvidljivije naslijeāe socijalizma u hrvatskoj popularnoj glazbi su komentari o svakod-
nevnom ﾞživotu u Jugoslaviji te ikonogra  ja koja predstavlja osobno i javno naslijeāe socijalizma 
nakon raspada Jugoslavije. Meāutim, negacija socijalistiĀkog iskustva u nekim antikomunistiĀkim 
glazbenim tekstovima i sama je naslijeāem socijalizma ﾖ– ne samo zato jer se bez socijalizma ne 
bi imalo ﾚšto negirati veþ i zbog kontinuiteta nazora da bi zabava trebala interpelirati potroﾚšaĀe 
unutar  drﾞžavno  poduprtog  kolektivnog  identiteta.  Taj  je  nazor  premostio  socijalistiĀko  i  rano 
postsocijalistiĀko razdoblje te nastavlja de  nirati granice prihvatljivog diskurzivnog polja kulturne 
produkcije. U zakljuĀku se razmatraju izgledi za teoriju popularne kulture u postsocijalizmu, pri 
Āemu povijesne i zemljopisne razlike oteﾞžavaju usporedbu.
KljuĀne rijeĀi:  socijalizam,  postsocijalizam,  popularna  kultura,  popularna  glazba,  Hrvatska, 
sjeþanje